Disentangling Choice of Law for Torts and Contracts by Kirgis, Rick
Washington and Lee Law Review Online 
Volume 72 Issue 1 Article 4 
8-5-2015 
Disentangling Choice of Law for Torts and Contracts 
Rick Kirgis 
Washington and Lee University School of Law, kirgisr@wlu.edu 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarlycommons.law.wlu.edu/wlulr-online 
 Part of the Contracts Commons, and the Torts Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Rick Kirgis, Disentangling Choice of Law for Torts and Contracts, 72 WASH. & LEE L. REV. ONLINE 71 (2015), 
https://scholarlycommons.law.wlu.edu/wlulr-online/vol72/iss1/4 
This Development is brought to you for free and open access by the Law School Journals at Washington & Lee 
University School of Law Scholarly Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Washington and Lee Law 
Review Online by an authorized editor of Washington & Lee University School of Law Scholarly Commons. For more 
information, please contact christensena@wlu.edu. 
 
71 
Disentangling Choice of Law for Torts 
and Contracts 
By Frederic L. Kirgis∗ 
Abstract 
In a federal system with state lines that are easily crossed, 
physically and electronically, legal disputes often raise choice-of-
law issues. Common among those disputes are torts and contracts 
cases. The courts have taken a variety of approaches to these cases, 
leading to inconsistent results that depend largely on which forum 
the plaintiff selects. Judicial fairness and economy dictate, or 
should dictate, that the choice-of-law issues be resolvable 
consistently and without unnecessarily tying up the courts or 
imposing large litigation costs, if it can be done in a principled 
manner. This article shows how it could be done. 
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I. From Rules to Policies 
A century ago, almost all judges and scholars faced with 
choice-of-law issues thought that the goal was to achieve 
predictable, uniform results that would be reached regardless of 
the judicial forum in which the issue was to be decided. Why, it 
was asked, should the plaintiff’s choice of forum dictate the 
result?1 That would be unfair, not to mention unsettling, for 
judges who would have to work out choice-of-law puzzles without 
principled guidance. Thus, what was needed—and what was 
actually in place under the First Restatement of Conflict of Laws, 
at least nominally—was a choice-of-law system that would lead 
any court that might hear a case to the same result that any 
other court would reach. For example, the First Restatement 
dictated that in tort cases, the law of the place of wrong would 
determine whether or not a cause of action existed.2 This seemed 
particularly important, as long-arm jurisdictional rules became 
increasingly flexible, allowing plaintiffs an expanding 
opportunity to forum shop.3 
Along came the choice-of-law revolution that the late 
Brainerd Currie spurred, who pointed out that rigid, jurisdiction-
selecting choice-of-law rules can produce irrational results.4 For 
example, traditional choice-of-law rules for torts dictated that the 
law of the place of harm should determine liability. But if a driver 
and a passenger from New York proceed in an automobile on a 
short round-trip to Ontario and have a one-car accident there 
                                                                                                     
 1. See 1 JOSEPH BEALE, TREATISE ON CONFLICT OF LAWS 105 (1916) (“A 
right having been created by the appropriate law, the recognition of its existence 
should follow everywhere. Thus, an act valid where done cannot be called into 
question anywhere.”). Joseph Beale was the Reporter for the First Restatement 
of Conflict of Laws. 
 2. See RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 377 cmt. a (1934). 
 3. See, e.g., SYMEON C. SYMEONIDES & WENDY COLLINS PERDUE, CONFLICT 
OF LAWS: AMERICAN, COMPARATIVE, INTERNATIONAL 842 (3d ed. 2012) (“One 
reason a plaintiff may choose a particular forum is because of its choice of law 
rules.”). 
 4. See BRAINERD CURRIE, SELECTED ESSAYS ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS 721–
26 (1963) (asserting in detail that applying Ontario law to an accident involving 
only New Yorkers riding together made no sense, even though the accident 
occurred in Ontario). 
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that injures the passenger, why should Ontario’s law determine 
the two New Yorkers’ rights and obligations toward each other? 
That makes no sense, said Currie.5 Good point, said the drafters 
of the Second Restatement of Conflict of Laws, but we should not 
throw out principles of predictability and uniformity altogether.6 
In tort and contract cases—among some others, especially those 
involving land titles—predictability and uniformity remain 
relevant in the Second Restatement, but they become just one 
combined factor among a list of factors to be taken into account.7 
The Second Restatement’s overall goal is to apply the law of the 
state which, with regard to the specific issue, has the most 
significant relationship to the transaction and the parties.8 
II. Torts and Contracts in the Second Restatement 
For torts cases, the Second Restatement supplies a 
presumptive choice of law, generally looking to the place of harm 
when the parties’ conduct is at issue (for example, having to do 
with the rules of the road)9 and looking to the residence or 
domicile of one or both parties when loss-allocation is at issue (for 
example, whether one party is immune from tort liability to the 
other party).10 So far so good, if we are concerned with 
                                                                                                     
 5. Id. The New York Court of Appeals agreed with him in Babcock v. 
Jackson, 191 N.E.2d 279, 285 (N.Y. 1963) (applying New York law); see also 
Brainerd Currie, Comments on Babcock v. Jackson, a Recent Development in 
Conflict of Laws, 63 Colum. L. Rev. 1212, 1216 (1963) (discussing the choice of 
law approach taken by the court in Babcock). 
 6. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 6 cmt. i (1971) 
(noting the value of predictability and uniformity). 
 7. See id. § 6(2)(f) (setting forth the factors for a court to consider in its 
analysis). The others are needs of the interstate or international system, 
relevant policies of the forum and other interested states, protection of justified 
expectations, policies underlying the particular field of law, and ease in the 
determination and application of the law to be applied. 
 8. In the tort and contract contexts, see id. §§ 145, 188. 
 9. See id. § 145 cmt. d (“A state has an obvious interest in regulating the 
conduct of persons within its territory.”). 
 10. See id. (“The local law of the state where the parties are domiciled, 
rather than the local law of the state of conduct and injury, may be applied to 
determine whether one party is immune from tort liability to the other.”). 
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predictability and uniformity of result, but there is a joker in the 
deck. The presumptive choice can be trumped by a laundry list of 
principles in section 6, but—as mentioned above—only one of 
them has to do with predictability and uniformity.11 Section 6 
leaves it to the courts to determine which principles are more 
significant in any given case than the others. Unpredictability 
and lack of uniformity ensue. 
The Second Restatement gives the parties to a contract quite 
a bit of leeway to make their own choice of law in the contract 
itself, although it limits their ability to determine which state’s 
law controls the contract’s validity.12 In the absence of an 
effective parties’ choice, the approach is very similar to the 
approach for torts: a list of relevant contacts, followed by 
comments supplying a presumptive choice of law. Usually it is 
the place of contracting for questions of validity (at least, if the 
place of contracting is not fortuitous),13 and the place of 
performance for questions relating to the nature of performance, 
or the party who is to perform, or the details of performance.14 
Sometimes it is the situs of the subject matter, as in a contract 
insuring against risks in a particular location.15 But again, the 
unruly presence of section 6 looms over the whole process. 
Courts in the United States have struggled mightily with 
choice-of-law issues ever since the choice-of-law revolution began. 
Some have stuck with the First Restatement, but they are now in 
the distinct minority. Most now apply, or try to apply, the Second 
                                                                                                     
 11. See id. § 6(2) (setting forth factors for a court to consider when 
conducting a choice of law analysis). For the others, see supra note 7. 
 12. See id. § 187 (disallowing the parties’ choice regarding validity if there 
is no substantial relationship with the chosen state and no other reasonable 
basis for the choice, or if application of the chosen state’s law would frustrate a 
fundamental policy of a state with a materially greater interest in determining 
validity). 
 13. See id. § 188 cmt. e (noting that the state of contracting usually is also 
“the state where the parties conducted the negotiations”). 
 14. See id. (“The state where performance is to occur under a contract has 
an obvious interest in the nature of the performance and in the party who is to 
perform.”). 
 15. See id. (“The state where the thing or the risk is located will have a 
natural interest in transactions affecting it. Also the parties will regard the 
location of the thing or of the risk as important.”). 
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Restatement. A few use other approaches or some hybrid 
thereof.16 Even those courts that espouse the First Restatement’s 
predictability and uniformity sometimes stray when strict loyalty 
would produce a result perceived to be unjust.17 
Unpredictability and lack of uniformity may not be the worst 
things that could possibly happen in the choice-of-law context, 
but unnecessary unpredictability or eclecticism surely should be 
avoided if it can be done in a principled way. Happily, a system 
can be devised that would simplify the process—thus enhancing 
both predictability and uniformity—without discarding all of the 
other values implicit in the section 6 laundry list. Moreover, it 
can be done without abandoning the basic approach of the Second 
Restatement. While preserving that approach, it would breathe 
new life into one of the section 6 laundry list items—ease in the 
determination and application of the law to be applied.18 
Even better, the approach suggested in this article could and 
should become a foundation for the American Law Institute’s 
recently proposed Third Restatement of Conflict of Laws, at least 
in the torts and contracts fields.19 Because the proposed Third 
Restatement “will be similar to its predecessors in structure and 
coverage,”20 there would be no barrier to adoption of an approach 
that builds on the Second Restatement.  
III. A Simplified System for Torts and Contracts 
                                                                                                     
 16. For a chart showing each state’s choice-of-law methodology in tort and 
contract cases, see Symeon C. Symeonides, Choice of Law in the American 
Courts in 2014: Twenty-Eighth Annual Report, 63 AM. J .COMP. L. (forthcoming 
2015). 
 17. See, e.g., Paul v. Nat’l Life, 352 S.E.2d 550, 556 (W. Va. 1986) (finding 
that the accident state’s automobile guest statute violated West Virginia’s public 
policy rather than simply applying West Virginia substantive law to the two 
West Virginia parties, despite the case being on all fours with Babcock v. 
Jackson). 
 18. See supra text accompanying note 7 (discussing the factors aside from 
uniformity and predictability). 
 19. The ALI announced the Third Restatement project in November 2014. 
See Press Release, Am. L. Inst., (Nov. 17, 2014), available at 
http://www.ali.org/email/pr-14-11-17.html.  
 20. Id. 
76 72 WASH. & LEE L. REV. ONLINE 71 (2015) 
Since the Second Restatement contains well-recognized 
issue-characterizations (for example, intentional torts as 
distinguished from negligent torts,21 or contract validity as 
distinguished from most issues relating to contract 
performance),22 a court should start the choice-of-law process by 
using the Second Restatement’s characterization that best fits the 
facts of the case. For most characterizations, the Second 
Restatement contains a connecting factor leading to the state 
whose law should presumptively be applied.23 In most cases, it 
will be the state that would be selected under the First 
Restatement’s rigid rules.24 
As will be explained below, a court should stick with the 
Second Restatement’s presumptive choice of law in tort and 
contract cases unless: 
(A) it would violate the Constitution to do so; or 
(B) the presumptive state is a non-interested state in a false 
conflict situation;25 or 
                                                                                                     
 21. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 156 cmt. d (1971) 
(“If, under the applicable law, the actor is liable only for intentional injuries, he 
will not be held liable for injury caused either by his negligence or by his 
recklessness.”). 
 22. The Second Restatement is not as rigid as the First Restatement 
regarding the line to be drawn between contract validity and contract 
performance. See id. ch. 8, intro. note (discussing the shift in choice of law in 
contract disputes). Nevertheless, the Second Restatement emphasizes the 
parties’ expectations and treats place of contracting and place of performance as 
separate, relevant factors relating to their expectations as to validity and 
performance of a contract. See, e.g., id. § 188 cmt. b (“Protection of justified 
expectations plays a less significant role in the choice-of-law process with 
respect to issues that involve the nature of the obligations imposed by a contract 
upon the parties rather than the validity of the contract or of some provision 
thereof.”). 
 23. “State,” as used in this article, would include a “nation” in a 
transnational case. 
 24. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 156 cmt. 
b(1971) (explaining how courts following the Second Restatement should factor 
location into their choice of law analysis). 
 25. It has been noted that courts already tend to go in this direction, even 
though they may not say so. See William A. Reppy, Jr., Eclecticism in Methods 
for Resolving Tort and Contract Conflict of Laws: The United States and the 
European Union, 82 TUL. L. REV. 2053, 2074 (2008) (discussing false conflicts); 
see also PETER HAY, PATRICK J. BORCHERS & SYMEON C. SYMEONIDES, CONFLICT 
OF LAWS 846–51 (5th ed. 2010). 
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(C) application of the presumptive state’s law would defeat 
the reasonable expectations of one of the parties; or 
(D) application of the presumptive state’s law would defeat or 
significantly impair a strong public policy of an interested state 
that is also the forum state. 
A. A Presumptive Choice of Law that Would Violate the U.S. 
Constitution  
The choice of a particular state’s law might violate the U.S. 
Constitution’s Due Process or Full Faith and Credit Clause, 
particularly if it is a choice of the forum state’s own law when the 
state’s contacts with, or interest in, the circumstances of the case 
are tenuous. The U.S. Supreme Court’s jurisprudence on the 
subject has mystified judges and scholars alike, and it will not be 
reviewed here.26 Suffice it to say that, obviously, the Constitution 
would trump any contrary choice of law. 
B. A Non-Interested State in a False-Conflict Situation  
Brainerd Currie, the progenitor of interest analysis as a 
choice-of-law method, insisted that it “makes no sense 
whatever”27 to apply the law of a state that has no interest in 
applying its own law. The classic case is Babcock v. Jackson, the 
case described above in which two New Yorkers were involved in 
a one-car accident in Ontario, and the only question was whether 
the negligent driver was liable for the passenger’s injuries. 
Ontario had an automobile guest statute that would have 
defeated the passenger’s claim, but New York had no guest 
statute. New York was interested in applying its own law 
(permitting recovery against the driver) to its own citizens, while 
Ontario would not be interested in applying its non-liability law 
                                                                                                     
 26. For those willing to give it a try, see Allstate Ins. Co. v. Hague, 449 U.S. 
302 (1981) and Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797 (1985). The 
Hofstra Law Review devoted two entire issues to the Allstate case. See 10 
Hofstra L. Rev. No. 1 (1981); id. No. 4 (1982). The results were inconclusive. 
 27. CURRIE, supra note 4, at 90. 
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to the strangers in its territory. In other words, the case 
presented a false conflict in favor of New York, as distinguished 
from a true conflict in which both states have an interest in 
applying their own law. 
Unfortunately for judges and litigants, relatively few cases 
are so easy. If Babcock v. Jackson had involved an Ontario driver 
and a New York passenger, with Ontario law protecting the 
negligent driver from liability to the passenger, but New York 
law imposing liability on the driver, it would have been a true 
conflict. Ontario would have been interested in protecting its own 
citizen from liability to a non-Ontario passenger, and New York 
would have been interested in giving its citizen a remedy against 
the non-New York driver. The choice of law would not be clear on 
interest-analysis grounds. The courts have struggled mightily on 
how to resolve true conflicts.28 There would be good reason in 
such cases simply to stick with the law of the place of harm. 
A state’s interest or non-interest can sometimes be assessed 
fairly simply, as in the above variation of Babcock v. Jackson. It 
is not always so simple. In the more difficult cases, a state’s 
interest, or lack thereof, can only be determined with any degree 
of confidence by first identifying the policy underlying its relevant 
rule of substantive law, and then determining whether that 
policy would be served by applying its law to the specific facts of 
the case at hand. It may be tempting, or even necessary, to 
speculate about the policy when a court in one state is looking at 
another state’s law and there is no clear statement of policy by 
that state’s highest court and no relevant legislative history. 
Fertile imaginations can be useful in some scenarios, but rarely 
in this one. 
The New York Court of Appeals learned this lesson in a pair 
of later cases involving two New Yorkers in the same car. In the 
first of these two cases, Dym v. Gordon,29 the New Yorkers were 
in Colorado. Because of the New York driver’s negligence, their 
                                                                                                     
 28. For samplings of such cases, see HERMA HILL KAY, LARRY KRAMER & 
KERMIT ROOSEVELT, CONFLICT OF LAWS: CASES, COMMENTS, QUESTIONS 175–223 
(9th ed. 2013); SYMEON C. SYMEONIDES & WENDY COLLINS PERDUE, CONFLICT OF 
LAWS: AMERICAN, COMPARATIVE, INTERNATIONAL—CASES AND MATERIALS 215–63 
(3d ed. 2012). 
 29. 209 N.E.2d 792 (N.Y. 1965). 
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car collided with another car on a Colorado road. The New York 
Court of Appeals speculated that “Colorado has an interest in 
seeing that the negligent defendant's assets are not dissipated in 
order that the persons in the car of the blameless driver will not 
have their right to recovery diminished by the present suit.”30 The 
existence of such a third party, said the majority opinion in Dym 
v. Gordon, was enough to distinguish Babcock v. Jackson, where 
there was no third party. Four years later, the New York Court of 
Appeals said that the construction placed on the Colorado guest 
statute in Dym v. Gordon “was mistaken.”31 It was too 
speculative. 
In Dym v. Gordon, as in Babcock v. Jackson, there was a 
false conflict in favor of New York. On the other hand, if Colorado 
actually had a policy to protect non-negligent third parties as the 
New York court postulated in Dym v. Gordon, and if the third 
parties were Coloradans, there would be no reason to depart from 
the Second Restatement’s presumptive choice of Colorado law. 
The case would have presented a true conflict and the court’s 
outcome in Dym v. Gordon would have been correct. 
A recent case in the Western District of New York illustrates 
how a court that labored to reach the correct decision could have 
done it without so much effort. The case arose from a crash of a 
commuter aircraft in 2009 on its final approach to the Buffalo 
Niagara International Airport. All forty-five passengers and the 
crew were killed. One of the plaintiffs in the ensuing consolidated 
action against the airline was domiciled in China, as had been his 
wife, who was killed in the crash. The federal district court, 
applying New York choice-of-law rules under the Klaxon case,32 
went through a six-page analysis to determine whether to apply 
New York’s generous measure of damages, as urged by the 
plaintiff, or China’s more restrictive measure, as urged by the 
airline. After analyzing several New York cases, none of which 
was directly on point, the court decided to apply New York law.33 
                                                                                                     
 30. Id. at 794. 
 31. Tooker v. Lopez, 249 N.E.2d 394, 397 (N.Y. 1969). 
 32. See Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Elec. Mfg. Co., 313 U.S. 487, 496 (1941) 
(concluding that the Erie doctrine applies to choice of law in a diversity case). 
 33. See In re Air Crash Near Clarence Ctr., New York, 983 F. Supp. 2d 249, 
252–58 (W.D.N.Y. 2013) (discussing the court’s choice of law analysis). The court 
 
80 72 WASH. & LEE L. REV. ONLINE 71 (2015) 
It would have been much easier if New York (and hence the 
federal court) had used the choice-of-law method suggested in 
this article. The federal court would have stuck with the Second 
Restatement’s presumptive state (New York, the place of harm), 
because China clearly would have had no interest in applying its 
restrictive recovery rule in favor of the U.S. airline and against 
the Chinese domiciliary. It would not have been a false conflict in 
favor of China. Under the approach suggested in this article, it is 
unnecessary to determine whether New York would be interested 
in applying its own law because the presumption favoring the 
place of harm could be rebutted only if the other state (or nation, 
in this case) has an interest in applying its own law. 
Another recent personal injury diversity case in New York 
illustrates how the approach suggested in this article would work 
if there is a true conflict. A New York worker was injured in New 
York while operating a machine manufactured in Ohio. New 
York’s loss-allocating law favored the worker; Ohio law favored 
the manufacturer. The federal court analyzed several New York 
cases and concluded that New York law should be applied.34 If 
New York used the approach put forward in this article, the court 
would simply explain that it was not a false conflict in favor of 
Ohio, so the loss-allocating law of New York, the place of injury, 
would apply. If there had been a true conflict between conduct-
regulating rules, the Second Restatement’s presumptive choice 
would normally be the place of conduct, and that state’s law 
would be applied.35 
Even in tort cases involving no physical injury, the approach 
suggested here should be used. For example, in a recent diversity 
                                                                                                     
paid particular attention to the leading New York tort choice-of-law case, 
Neumeier v. Kuehner, 286 N.E.2d 454, 457–58 (1972), which sets forth a three-
rule framework for resolving choice-of-law issues in cases involving conflicting 
loss-allocating laws. 
 34. Fargas v. Cincinnati Mach., LLC, 986 F. Supp. 2d 420, 427 (S.D.N.Y. 
2013). 
 35. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND), CONFLICT OF LAWS § 145 cmts. c–e (1971) 
(explaining how the presumption usually works); Williams v. Novartis Pharm. 
Corp., 15 F. Supp. 3d 761, 766 (S.D. Ohio 2014) (applying the law of the place of 
conduct when the rule is intended to deter or punish conduct); Kirchman v. 
Novartis Pharm. Corp., No. 8:06-cv-1787-T-24-TBM, 2014 WL 2722483, at *4 
(M.D. Fla. June 16, 2014) (approving the reasoning in Williams). 
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case, the federal district court in Connecticut addressed issues 
relating to misappropriation of trade secrets in much the same 
manner as suggested here.36 Pepsico, headquartered in New 
York, allegedly misappropriated trade secrets of the plaintiff 
company headquartered in Connecticut. The plaintiff relied on a 
Connecticut statute that would provide a claim for relief, but 
there was no comparable law in New York. Although the court 
did not quite use the language of interest analysis, it effectively 
recognized that there was a true conflict on this issue. It looked to 
the Second Restatement’s presumptive choice of law stressing the 
place where the conduct occurred (here, New York) in 
misappropriation cases. The court stuck with it and correctly 
declined to apply the Connecticut statute.37 
In another recent tort diversity case where there was no 
physical injury, members of a non-profit organization sued the 
organization for unjust enrichment.38 They claimed that they 
were led to believe that their payments of special assessments 
that the organization imposed were required for their 
membership, when in fact the payments were not required. The 
organization was headquartered in Washington, D.C., where the 
law provided no such remedy. The plaintiffs resided in California, 
where a statutory remedy was available. The Court of Appeals for 
the D.C. Circuit, relying on a case that the District of Columbia 
Court of Appeals decided,39 recognized that it was a true conflict 
and applied forum law as a tiebreaker after a four-page analysis 
involving a “qualitative weighing” of relevant factors.40 The 
Second Restatement’s presumptive choice would have been 
California law because California was the state in which the 
plaintiffs received and relied on the defendant’s misleading 
                                                                                                     
 36. See Bulldog N.Y. LLC v. Pepsico, Inc., 8 F. Supp. 3d 152, 154 (D. Conn. 
2014) (describing the court’s choice of law analysis). 
 37. Id. at 162–63 (relying on RESTATEMENT (SECOND), CONFLICT OF LAWS § 
145 cmt f). The remainder of the court’s opinion fell short of the approach 
suggested in this article. 
 38. In re APA Assessment Fee Litig., 766 F.3d 39, 41 (D.C. Cir. 2014). 
 39. Washkoviak v. Student Loan Mktg. Ass’n, 900 A.2d 168, 179 (D.C. 
2006). 
 40. In re APA Assessment Fee Litig., 766 F.3d at 51–55 (explaining the 
“qualitative weighing” characterization on page 51). 
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representations.41 If the earlier D.C. case had used the approach 
suggested in this article, the federal court would have followed 
that approach under the Klaxon case42 and should have stuck 
with California law to resolve the true conflict. The judicial task 
would have been much simpler, and the result would have been 
both rational and fair. 
In an invasion-of-privacy case, 43 the federal district court in 
Colorado reached the correct conclusion, but could have done it 
more easily if it had used the approach suggested here. A same-
sex New Jersey married couple and their wedding photographer 
brought the invasion-of-privacy action against Colorado political 
advocacy organizations. The organizations had circulated, in 
Colorado, a photograph of the couple kissing at their wedding. 
The organizations’ aim was to discredit some political candidates 
in Colorado who advocated legalizing same-sex relationships. One 
of the defendants, a Colorado organization, argued that the 
defendant-favoring New Jersey tort law should be applied to the 
dispute.44 The Colorado Supreme Court in another case had 
adopted the Restatement Second’s most-significant-relationship 
test for multi-state torts.45 The federal court in the case at hand 
ploughed through all the factors in Restatement Second section 
145 and concluded that they weighed in favor of Colorado law, 
rather than New Jersey law.46 In a footnote,47 the court said there 
was no need to apply Restatement Second section 152, which 
would have made its job easier. Under section 152 and its 
comment c, the place of invasion of privacy would be applied, and 
when the invasion involves the publication of information about 
the plaintiff or the appropriation of his or her likeness, the 
                                                                                                     
 41. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 148 cmts. f, g 
(1971).  
 42. Supra note 32. 
 43. See Hill v. Pub. Advocate of the U.S., 35 F. Supp. 3d 1347, 1353 (D. 
Colo. 2014) (choosing between New Jersey and Colorado law). 
 44. See id. (discussing various arguments on choice of law). 
 45. See AE, Inc. v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 168 P.3d 507, 508 (Colo. 
2007) (choosing to follow the most-significant-relationship test for certain torts 
cases). 
 46. See Hill, 35 F. Supp. 3d at 1355 (applying Colorado law). 
 47. See id., n.2 (discussing the Second Restatement, but stating that it did 
not need to use it to reach its result). 
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invasion is where the matter was communicated to someone other 
than the plaintiff.48 That would be Colorado in this case. There 
would be no reason to depart from the presumptive choice 
because New Jersey would not be interested in protecting the 
Colorado defendant, and there would be no other reason to depart 
from the presumptive choice of Colorado law. 
The approach suggested here could be used in multistate 
defamation cases as well. The Second Restatement’s presumptive 
choice would normally be the state where the person claiming to 
be harmed (the plaintiff) is domiciled, if the allegedly defamatory 
matter was published in that state.49 If that state’s law favors the 
defendant, there would not be a false conflict in favor of any other 
state: if the law of the defendant’s domicile also favors the 
defendant, there would be no conflict of laws; if the law of the 
defendant’s domicile favors the plaintiff, that state would have no 
interest in applying its own law. In either case, the Restatement’s 
presumptive choice would normally carry the day, and the 
plaintiff would not prevail.50 If the law of the plaintiff’s domicile 
favors the plaintiff (for example, if it considers the matter 
defamatory to the plaintiff), and if the state of the defendant’s 
domicile does not consider the matter defamatory, there would be 
a true conflict. The court should again stick with the 
Restatement’s presumptive choice, but this time it would lead to 
the plaintiff’s recovery if the defamation can be proved and if 
there is no constitutional impediment. 
This article’s approach would also be effective in the context 
of interstate contracts. Determining what is or is not a false 
conflict might in some cases require a somewhat different 
approach than in the typical tort case, but the goal would remain 
the same: to determine whether there is a false conflict in favor of 
a state other than the presumptive state. Thus, if the issue is the 
contract’s validity and the presumptive state—usually the place 
                                                                                                     
 48. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 152 (1971); id. cmt. 
c (discussing choice of law for invasion of privacy claims). 
 49. See id. § 150(2) (showing how the specific rule changes the 
presumption). 
 50. This result was reached in Catalanello v. Kramer, 18 F. Supp. 3d 504, 
513 (S.D.N.Y. 2014), although the court did not use the reasoning I have 
suggested in this article. 
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of the last event necessary to complete the making of the 
contract—is not the residence or domicile of either party, it might 
still be an interested state if, for example, it is a commercial 
center that benefits from drawing in non-resident parties to make 
their deals. If so, there would not be a false conflict in favor of a 
state other than the presumptive state, even if the law of the 
other state would favor its own resident. 
A Connecticut Supreme Court decision51 nicely illustrates the 
approach in a contracts context. Reichhold Chemicals, Inc. sued 
several of its liability insurance carriers to determine the 
coverage for cleaning up environmental contamination at 
Reichold’s facility in Tacoma, Washington. The issues concerned 
interpretation of pollution-exclusion clauses in the insurance 
contracts and allocation of damages among the carriers. The 
contracts did not contain choice-of-law clauses. All insurance 
carriers either were headquartered in New York or dealt with the 
plaintiff through their New York offices. New York law favored 
the insurers; Washington law favored the insured. 
The Connecticut Supreme Court, following the Restatement 
Second’s approach for risk-insurance contracts,52 began with a 
presumption favoring the law of the place where the insured risk 
is located. The court then found that New York and Washington 
were both interested states and said, “[W]e cannot conclude that 
New York’s interests so substantially outweigh Washington’s 
interests as to overcome the presumption of § 193 of the 
Restatement (Second).”53 In other words, it was a true conflict, 
and the court stuck with the presumptive choice of law. 
C. The Reasonable Expectations of One of the Parties 
Obviously, a court should try not to defeat the expectations of 
a party that has reasonably relied on a promise that another 
party made, unless there is an overriding public policy reason to 
                                                                                                     
 51. See Reichhold Chems., Inc. v. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., 750 A.2d 
1051, 1054 (Conn. 2000) (conducting choice of law analysis in a contracts case). 
 52. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND), CONFLICT OF LAWS § 193. 
 53. See Reichhold, 750 A.2d at 1057 (explaining the reasoning for their 
choice). 
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do so. In the choice-of-law context, a clear case for contract 
enforcement would be one in which parties with comparable 
bargaining power have agreed on a choice-of-law clause in their 
contract, and one party has relied on it. Even if there has been no 
actual reliance, a choice-of-law clause in a non-adhesion contract 
should normally be enforced, at least if the chosen state has some 
reasonable relationship with the parties or the transaction. And 
even in a form contract, a choice-of-law clause should normally be 
enforced if the party seeking escape from it was given reasonable 
notice of it before the contract was signed and was not otherwise 
treated unfairly in the contracting process. 
Of course, reasonable expectations regarding choice of law in 
a contract situation could exist even if there is no choice-of-law 
clause in the contract. For example, if the parties have negotiated 
a contract that is to be performed largely or entirely in the state 
where the negotiations occurred, normally the expectation would 
be that the law of that state would apply to the agreement. A 
court should be reluctant to apply the law of some other state 
that would invalidate the contract or adversely affect the 
performance of one of the parties. Other examples could be given. 
The point is simply that reasonable expectations regarding 
applicable law may arise in a variety of situations and should 
normally be respected. 
The Connecticut Supreme Court in Reichhold, discussed 
above, considered not only the states’ interests, but also the 
parties’ expectations. The court said  
As an additional important consideration, the application of a 
state’s law should not run counter to the justified expectations 
of the parties . . . . Applying Washington law, however, does 
not violate the justified expectations of the parties when the 
targeted site is in Washington and the other risks that they 
insured are located in multiple jurisdictions all outside New 
York.54  
The court got it right. 
 
                                                                                                     
 54. Id. at 1058. 
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D. The Public Policy Exception  
If applying the law of another state would defeat or 
significantly impair a clear and firmly-held public policy of an 
interested forum state, the forum state cannot be expected—in 
the absence of Constitutional compulsion—to apply the other 
state’s law, even if the other state’s law would normally be 
chosen. This escape device should be applied sparingly, especially 
if the other state is another state of the United States rather than 
a foreign nation.55 Justice Cardozo (then a judge on the New York 
Court of Appeals) said it best: the public policy escape device 
should be applied only when the other state’s law would truly 
“violate some fundamental principle of justice, some prevalent 
conception of good morals, or some deep-rooted tradition of the 
common weal.”56 
Courts in the United States that still follow the rigid First 
Restatement place-of-wrong rule for torts have sometimes been 
tempted to stretch the public policy escape device to avoid the 
First Restatement result. In Paul v. National Life,57 the West 
Virginia Supreme Court used it to avoid applying an Indiana 
guest statute that would have precluded recovery by a West 
Virginia passenger against a West Virginia driver stemming from 
a one-car accident in Indiana. Justice Cardozo surely did not have 
this sort of case in mind when he penned the public policy test 
quoted above. In this Babcock v. Jackson situation, it would be 
much more convincing simply to recognize that Indiana was a 
non-interested state in a false-conflict situation. West Virginia 
law would be chosen on that basis rather than on public policy 
grounds. 
Public policy cases in the contracts context often involve an 
adhesion contract with a dispute-settlement clause that is valid 
in the contracting state, but that is deemed procedurally and 
                                                                                                     
 55. If the other state is a state of the United States, the Constitution’s Full 
Faith and Credit clause could preclude the use of a public policy escape device in 
some circumstances. See, e.g., Broderick v. Rosner, 294 U.S. 629, 634 (1935); 
Order of United Commercial Travelers v. Wolfe, 331 U.S. 586, 590 (1947). 
 56. Loucks v. Standard Oil Co. of N.Y., 120 N.E.2d 198, 202 (N.Y. 1918). 
 57. See Paul v. Nat’l Life, 352 S.E.2d 550, 556 (choosing not to apply 
Indiana law under the public policy exception) (W. Va. 1986). 
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substantively unconscionable in the state of the party resisting 
its enforcement. These cases are usually true conflicts, so the only 
persuasive reason to depart from the presumptive choice of law is 
the strong public policy of the forum.58 That is appropriate if the 
unconscionability escape device is not being used simply as a 
crutch to choose the forum’s own law. 
The public policy exception should be used only if the forum 
state’s own public policy is at stake. A forum state simply is not 
well equipped to figure out another state’s public policy and apply 
it to override the otherwise-applicable choice of law. A recent 
personal injury case in the federal district court in West Virginia 
is illustrative.59 A group of West Virginia plaintiffs brought a 
class action against the Massachusetts manufacturer of 
transvaginal surgical mesh, alleging that after it had been 
implanted, it had caused them severe complications. The 
plaintiffs sought compensatory and punitive damages. The 
defendant moved for partial summary judgment on the punitive 
damages claim, arguing that Massachusetts substantive law 
should be applied. The plaintiffs argued for application of West 
Virginia’s plaintiff-favoring law. West Virginia still follows the 
traditional place-of-harm rule for tort cases, so the federal court 
in West Virginia held in favor of the plaintiffs. The result should 
be the same under the approach suggested in this article, but the 
reasoning would be slightly different. The court would first look 
to the place of harm under the Second Restatement and then 
would determine whether to apply any of the four possible 
exceptions set forth earlier in this article. The only one that 
might arguably apply would be the public policy exception, 
because Massachusetts presumably would want its defendant-
favoring policy to be applied in favor of the Massachusetts 
defendant. True enough, but West Virginia had a competing 
public policy that would favor the plaintiffs. The court in West 
Virginia could not reasonably be expected to weigh the 
                                                                                                     
 58. See, e.g., Flemma v. Halliburton Energy Servs., Inc., 303 P.3d 814, 817 
(N.M. 2013) (looking at public policy to make a choice of law decision). 
 59. See Hendricks v. Boston Scientific Corp., 51 F. Supp. 3d 638, 641 (S.D. 
W. Va. 2014) (choosing between Massachusetts and West Virginia law). 
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inconsistent public policies against each other. It should (and did) 
stick with the place-of-harm rule. 
IV. Conclusion 
Choice of law in a tort or contract case does not have to be as 
difficult as the courts or the commentators have made it. 
Principled simplicity in this context would not only rein in forum 
shopping; it would also free up judicial resources, reduce the cost 
of litigation, and provide a legal structure that is understandable 
not only for judges and lawyers, but also for the ordinary citizens 
who are subject to it. These are laudable and attainable goals.  
